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Abstract  
Civil-military relations in Ghana has followed a checkered pattern since independence. Efforts to establish a 
workable civil-military relations in the first three republics failed to work. It is only in the Fourth Republic that, 
the military seem to demonstrate commitment to the constitutional order (Diamond, 2005). It is, therefore, 
important to establish that the military now take their subordination to civilian leaders as appropriate and that 
democratic norms are forming among the military. The study used qualitative research design to examine these 
issues. The findings show that democratic norms are forming among the military which does acknowledge that 
democratically elected leaders must rule. There is, moreover, institutional learning by the Ghanaian military 
about the not very impressive role in politics. This and other elements like a functioning democracy, the 
Rawlings factor, and the ability of elections to mediate the main conflict in the Ghanaian society in the Fourth 
Republic are to explain the current civil-military relations in Ghana.      
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Introduction  
The Fourth Republic of Ghana is stabilizing in its democratic governance. This is evident in the conduct of seven 
relatively free and fair elections since 1992, with three political turnovers in 2000, 2008 and 2016. This marks a 
clear departure from the three previous republics which were overthrown by the military. Democratization is, 
thus, a dominant feature of Ghana’s Fourth Republic. However, Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1999) argued that 
democratic governance in Ghana’s Fourth Republic has hardly reformed the institutions of the Ghanaian state 
and that neo-patrimonial politics remained dominant. This is considered a structural problem which emanates 
from the design of the constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana. Meanwhile, the incidents of three political 
turnovers create the impression that the Armed Forces of Ghana has been placed under democratic authority 
(Kohn, 1997). Is democratic control of the military becoming a norm in Ghana’s body politic?  
The design of the fourth republican constitution is seen as creating a hegemonic president, due to the 
overwhelming nature of the appointing powers of the president with respect to the public service of Ghana 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1994, 2010; Prempeh, 2008). The constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana empowers the 
president to appoint all the political leaders of the public service of Ghana and several administrative heads.  The 
president appoints over eighty percent of the members of the Armed Forces Council (Republic of Ghana, 1992). 
Article 211 of the Fourth Republican constitution of Ghana establishes the Ghana Armed Forces Council which 
consists of the Vice-President; The Ministers responsible for defence, foreign affairs and internal affairs; The 
Chief of Defence Staff; the Service Chiefs and a senior Warrant Officer or its equivalent in the Armed Forces; 
and two other persons appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State.  Article 212 
also gives the president power to appoint, acting in accordance with the advice of the Armed Forces Council, the 
Chief of Defense Staff of the Armed Forces, the Service Chiefs, and officers of the Armed Forces who shall be 
given such command as the Armed Forces Council shall determine.   
With the exception of the senior Warrant Officer on the Armed Forces Council, the President appoints 
all the other members on the council. It should be stated that the president is mandated to consult with the 
Council of State in the execution of this duty. This institutional arrangement virtually politicizes the Armed 
Forces Council because it clearly leaves room for partisan interests (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).  Can the structure of 
the military be said to have played any role in what this study at this initial moment refers to as stabilizing civil-
military relations?     
It is argued that the nature and performance of public sector organisations are crucial elements in 
determining the developmental capacities of states (Turner, Hulme, & McCourt, 2015).  However, process 
theorists argue that the nature and performance of the public sector are a manifestation of the character and 
capacity of the state (Leftwich, 2008). It is, therefore, the character and capacity of the state which determine a 
state’s developmental capacity and the capacity of the state is, in turn, a function of its politics.   
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The two arguments above by Turner et al. (2015) and Leftwich (2008) relate to the debate about 
politics-institution nexus (March & Olsen, 1984). Which of the two, politics or institutions, is responsible for 
institutional outcomes? What impacts, therefore, have the structure of the Ghana Armed Forces and the politics 
of the governments of the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party had on civil-military 
relations in the Fourth Republic of Ghana, 1993-2017? 
The problem of the study, therefore, emanates from the debate about politics-institution nexus referred 
to above (March & Olsen, 1984). Has the constitution of the fourth republic of Ghana established and, therefore, 
maintained democratic control over the Ghana Armed Forces, or is it rather the (democratic) politics of the 
Ghanaian state which has effectively placed the Ghanaian military under civilian control? Does the Ghana 
Armed Forces effectively execute their duties to defend Ghana and any other duty that the President may 
determine (Republic of Ghana: 1992, Article 210/3)? The defence duty of the Ghana Armed Forces is 
operationalized in this study to include not only defence against external aggression but also to uphold the 
democratic regime as established in the constitution of the fourth republic of Ghana.  
The study investigates the paradox of a stable democratic politics in the Fourth Republic of Ghana in 
which the constitution potentially introduces partisan politics into the military (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010.). 
Specifically, the study was guided by the following research questions:  
1. Has the politics of the fourth republic of Ghana successfully established norms of civilian control over 
the Ghanaian military given that the constitution of the fourth republic of Ghana, de jure, politicizes the 
military institution?   
2. What are the causal elements responsible for the current state of civil-military relations in Ghana and 
their potential to make the military submit to civilian authority?    
 
Theoretical Framework  
The literature of state building and state effectiveness essentially emphasizes either the policy process or the 
structure and orientation of public bureaucracies as the main agent of change (Leftwich, 2008; Turner et al., 
2015). This segment of the study develops two conceptual frameworks and then proceeds to establish a point of 
convergence between them. The frameworks are the public bureaucracy model (Turner et al., 2015), and the 
political process model (Leftwich, 2008).  
The Public Bureaucracy Model 
The way the public bureaucracy is structured in any country and the contextual elements there are 
responsible for the way the relevant country’s public sector is managed (Turner et al., 2015). This understanding 
brings out the significance of the Weberian “ideal type” model (Handley & Mills, 2001, Turner et al., 2015). The 
Weberian model serves as an analytical model, a comparative tool by which one can assess the degree and form 
of bureaucratization in a society. It sought to rationalize the collective activities which characterize the modern 
society, by introducing professionalism into the public service. According to Handley and Mills, the model 
emphasizes, among others formal rules, a formal division of labour, hierarchically structured offices, and 
meritorious mode of recruitment.   
According to Turner et al. (2015), the structuring of the bureaucracies tends to be dominated by two 
orientations: one in which appointed administrators wield much power vis-à-vis elected politicians, and the other 
in which the power of elected politicians tramps the appointed administrators. The second represents de jure 
politicization of the public bureaucracy with the aim of empowering elected politicians to be able to oversee the 
implementation of the policies formulated out of their party manifestoes. Turner et al. refer to the 1977 World 
Development Report which establishes a positive impact of the public bureaucracy on economic growth in 
developing countries. The report emphasizes meritorious mode of recruitment as most significantly impacting on 
economic growth, followed by promotion from within and career stability in that order.    
The Political Process Model 
Leftwich  argues that the forms and outcomes of political process in any political system “are both framed by, 
and help to shape, the structural environment, internal and external, the distributions and balances of power, 
ideas, ideologies, interest and, crucially, the formal and informal institutions through which they all work” 
(Leftwich, 2008: 5). This position underscores the primacy of politics and how it inter-relates with institutions in 
the life of any human community. Leftwich also emphasizes that the survival and prosperity of these 
communities are contingent on their ability to establish mechanisms for taking authoritative public decisions 
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about the production, distribution and use of resources (generally defined to refer to anything which could be 
utilized to advance people’s interest, material or ideal).   
People essentially disagree about how life should be organized collectively for the benefit of all 
members of the community. Citizens in a political system need not necessarily share common political values 
and beliefs. There are, therefore, political subcultures in political systems (Diamond, 2005). What system of 
government should be put in place and who should occupy which office and why? How should resources, in 
general, be distributed? Politics, in this manner, fundamentally involves the “phenomena of conflict and 
cooperation” and people do not necessarily agree on issues bothering on collective life, and, especially, on how 
the community should be organized in terms of government. However, in order to ensure the survival and 
prosperity of the community, they recognise the need to cooperate with others.  
This study, therefore, conceptualizes politics as involving activities which relate to the making of 
collective decisions about resource use. These activities involve conflict and cooperation. This conception of 
politics leans very much on definitions of politics which all emphasize conflict, competition for power, and the 
ability to influence collective decisions (Brewster, l963; Easton, 1953; Jackson & Jackson, 1997). 
 The study’s conception of politics emphasizes public decisions in the sense that such decisions involve 
and affect the majority of people (if not all) in the state. It, therefore, seeks to establish a distinction between the 
public and the private spheres. In this understanding, public decisions are expected to bind all members of the 
state, whereas private decisions do not bind anyone outside of the group (including families, and voluntary 
associations) involved. Again, the conception of politics in this study indicates that politics is authoritative, and 
that formal power is inherent in the processes involved in the making of the decisions. The decisions so made, 
therefore, become binding for all members of the political community (the public), and are authoritative in that 
coercion may be applied to ensure compliance.    
The argument in this study is, therefore, that the behaviour of public organisations and their outcomes 
are essentially the outcomes of politics and its interplay with institutions, the level which concerns the rules of 
the game—the emergence and legitimation (or institutionalization) of the rules of the game or institutions—and 
the level at which games within the rules occurs, the application of the rules in real life cases (emphasis mine).  
Politics (or the political process), therefore, helps to shape the structural environment in which societal 
activities occur and these activities, in turn, shape politics (March & Olsen, 1984). In some polities (the stable 
ones), the process has engendered a settled consensus on the basic political rules as well as the rules of the game. 
This refers essentially to the basic institutions of the state (the constitution of state).       
Convergence of the Models  
The two models converge in the second one, the political process model. The convergence manifests in 
the understanding that the behaviour of public organisations and their outcomes are essentially the outcomes of 
politics and its interplay with institutions, the level which concerns the rules of the game—the emergence and 
legitimation (or institutionalization) of the rules of the game or institutions—and the level at which games within 
the rules occurs, the application of the rules in real life cases. 
Research Methodology  
This section outlines the methodology used for the study. The section highlights the research design, sources of 
data, data collection tools, sampling and sampling techniques and analysis of data.  
Research Design  
The research design is qualitative and exploratory with. This design is selected to explore the growing 
phenomena of politics-administration nexus and their impact on public organisations with particular reference to 
the Ghana Armed Forces. Qualitative research is by definition exploratory. That is, qualitative research 
facilitates the collection of detailed information from individuals and groups and then generates case studies and 
summaries rather than lists of numeric data (Creswell, 2013). This study focuses on individual members of the 
Ministry of Defence of Ghana.   
Sources of Primary Data, Population, Sampling Technique and Sample 
The data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Specifically, politicians, political science 
lecturers, senior and junior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Defence, senior and junior officers of the Ghana 
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Armed Forces, non-commission officers, publications from journals, textbooks and the mass media (both print 
and electronics) were the sources from which the data for the study were collected.   
In this study, the population covered the following groups: the staff of the Ministry of Defence; 
politicians who occupied one of the following offices: president, vice president and minister of defense; 
members of the Ghana Armed Forces, and political science lecturers. 
In this study, purposive sampling was selected because it enabled the selection of unique respondents as 
outlined above. The primary consideration of this method was to zero in on individuals who have personally 
experienced civil-military politics. Moreover, there was the need to get respondents known to the researcher or 
introduced to the researcher by someone who could assure the respondents about the dignity of the researcher 
and hence his ability to keep the identity of the respondent confidential.     
Regarding the sample size, twenty respondents were engaged in the interviews and twenty engaged in 
focus group discussions in the data collected for this study. The twenty non-commissioned officers of the Ghana 
Armed Forces participated in the focus group discussion. The focus group discussants were divided into three 
groups, with two of the groups consisting of 7 members each, and the third group consisting of 6 members. In 
sum, the population comprised two politicians, two political science lecturers, three senior bureaucrats from the 
Ministry of Defense, three junior bureaucrats from the Ministry of Defense, Five senior officers of the Ghana 
Armed Forces, Five junior officers of the Ghana Armed Forces, and twenty non-commission officers of the 
Ghana Armed Forces. 
Data Collection, Processing and Analysis Procedure  
The study used in-depth personal interviews and focus group discussions as data collection methods. The 
interviews did not follow any specified set of questions, neither were questions asked in any specified order. The 
respondents were asked to tell their stories on all the issues raised in this study which are:  
• Authority relations in the Ghana Armed Forces and how this affected professionalism in the forces in 
the fourth republic of Ghana,  
• Relationship between the top civilian members of the Ministry of Defence and members of the military 
command,    
• Civil-military politics in the Ghana Armed Forces in the fourth republic of Ghana,  
• The incidence of norm formation about democratic control of the military among members of the 
military.  
There was the need to ask follow-up questions so as to get clarification on some issues and (in the case 
of others) get additional details. The data collection methods selected for this study are most suitable for this 
study for several reasons. Firstly, the respondents have actually gone through the experience relevant for this 
study. The use of non-structured interviews ensured that various respondents tell their own story. The liberties 
granted respondents allowed them to provide their own definitions of situations as they experienced them and 
provide most detailed information. The interviews were recorded on audio tapes and later transcribed and coded. 
Three focus group discussions were conducted. There were seven people in two groups and six in one of them. 
The researcher moderated the discussions himself and was guided by prepared questions. 
The information gathered from the interviews were transcribed each day immediately after the 
interviews and stored in computer files. When the interview of any particular group ended, the transcripts were 
thoroughly read in their entirety to grasp the sense of the interview as a whole and then broken into parts, in 
terms of relevant themes before the next group interview got done. The objective was to get as thorough as 
possible an understanding of the data. The reading of interviews thoroughly and their breaking into parts 
constitute the initial categories of the data processing. The transition of the data in parts to their organization into 
themes and subthemes involves detailed understanding of the data, their analysis and interpretation in light of the 
researcher’s view and the “views of perspectives in the literature” (Creswell, 2013: 184). This analysis was 
followed by deductive analysis to gather evidence to support the themes and their interpretations. Finally, the 
findings were discussed in the framework of the researcher’s personal view, the existing literature, and the 
“emerging models that seem to adequately convey the essence of the findings” (Creswell, 2013: 52). 
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Analysis and Discussion  
This section presents the analysis and discussion of the data collected. The analysis is presented with regards to 
the research questions. The findings are discussed making reference to secondary data.  
Has the Politics of the Fourth Republic of Ghana Successfully Established Norms of Democratic Control 
over the Ghanaian Military? 
Civilian control, essentially, is thus a normative issue which rests on a set of ideas, institutions, and behaviors 
that has developed over time in democratic societies (Hutchful, 1997a, 1997b; Koln, 1997). The constitutions of 
states and the general societal norms provide the main sources of norms which guide social behavior broadly 
defined to include political and economic behavior (Diamond, 2005; Gyimah-Boadi, 2010; Hutchful, 1997a; 
Koln, 1997; Prempeh, 2008).   
The fourth republican constitution of Ghana establishes a de jure democratic control over the military in 
much the same way that the earlier three republics which failed did. The implication here is that it is one thing 
establishing structures in a constitution; it is another getting the constitution to become the norm which really 
guides actions and inactions (Hutchful, 1997a; Prempeh, 2008). The analysis in this segment of the study is done 
from the following perspectives:  constitutional provisions and the governing structure of the military, controls 
through governmental institutions, and civil society oversight. The analysis makes use of both primary and 
secondary data collected for the study.  
Constitutional Provisions as the Governing Structure of the Military  
Article 210 of the 1992 Constitution states that there shall be the Armed Forces of Ghana which shall consist of 
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by Parliament. The 
command structure puts the President at the very top. He or she, by the constitution, is the Commander-in-Chief 
(CIC) of the Armed Forces, although this title is not used in the fourth republican constitution. This is followed 
by the Armed Forces Council which happens to be the highest decision taking body. This body comprises the 
Vice President who is the Chairman of the Council, the Ministers of Defence, Interior and Foreign affairs, the 
Chief of Defence Staff, the various Service Commanders, the Forces Sergent Major (FSM) and two other 
appointees appointed by the president in consultation with the Council of State. The Minister of Defence follows 
in the chain of command. After the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff then the Service 
commanders completes the structure.  
Furthermore, there are other appointments that fill the gap in the event the above stated structure is not 
available. These include the General Officer Commanding at the various commands. This relates to the 
Northern, Central and Southern Commands. In accordance with an official statement issued on Wednesday, 22 
March, 2000 by the Secretary to the President, the commanders of the 1st Infantry Brigade Group in the south 
and the 2nd Infantry Brigade Group in the north were appointed General Officers Commanding the Southern and 
the Northern Commands of the Ghana Army respectively (Daily Graphic 23rd March 2000). This arrangement 
was reviewed in 2015 when a third command was introduced. This meant that the Ghana Army now has 
Northern, Central and Southern Commands all headed by General Officer Commanders.   
The adequacy and effectiveness of such measures has been questioned, however, especially during the 
eight-year civilian rule of President Rawlings and the NDC. According to one respondent, the “presence and 
influence of the military…remained strong and visible” as far as civil-military relations is concerned (Fieldwork, 
2018). In the eight-year rule of President Rawlings, serving military officers were appointed to government 
positions, and soldiers continued to engage in partisan politics (Agyeman-Duah, 2002; Hutchful, 1997a). 
Additionally, Rawlings continued to rely on the personal loyalty of one section of the military, the specially 
trained and better equipped 64th Regiment, as an instrument of control both within the military and of the 
civilian population.  Rawlings thus “seemed more committed to upholding the supremacy of the military and its 
abrasive tradition than subjecting the institution to democratic control” (Agyeman-Duah, 2002: 10).  
When President Kufuor assumed office in 2001, one concern was the response of the Armed Forces and 
whether it would respect constitutional rule, given its association with the NDC. The NPP government 
introduced reform packages with the main objective of making the military truly professional and a politically 
non-partisan institution. The reforms of the military included the banning of the ACDR and all other political 
organizations from the barracks. Soldiers were withdrawn from policing duties, where brutalities against 
civilians tended to occur most; the 64th Regiment was redeployed on international peacekeeping duties; facilities 
at barracks have been upgraded and retirement conditions improved (Agyeman-Duah, 2002). 
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Additionally, the Minister of Defense has aimed at strengthening civil-military relations through 
encouraging interaction between the military and civil society, with dialogue taking place in public seminars and 
forums (Agyeman-Duah, 2002). As noted by Agyeman-Duah, the mechanisms to achieve this goal include 
seminars between senior military officers and media representatives, one of which was held in May 2001. 
Furthermore, a series of public forums for civilians and all ranks of military personnel were held in the six 
regional capitals with garrisons in June and July 2001.  
The data collected on civil-military relations in the fourth republic of Ghana further indicate that 
gradual progress continues to be made to bring the military under democratic control. The gains made between 
1993 and 2008 under Presidents Rawlings and Kufour continues to be consolidated under subsequent 
governments. The Ministry of Defence continues to be the main governing structure, with the Minister, a civilian 
in charge.  The reality, however, depicts a case of collaboration between civilian counterparts of the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces. The traditionally weak ministerial control has been improving. For 
example, the sensitive issue of Ministerial financial responsibility for the Armed Forces is currently reinforced. 
The defence budgets are prepared by the Finance Ministry with inputs from the military officers. The civilian 
members of the Ministry of Defence also control procurement issues.    
  A degree of control through the legislature and judiciary also exists. Parliament’s oversight role is 
implemented mainly through the Select Committee on Defence, given responsibility for generally overseeing the 
military, including review of its annual budget. It is stated, however, that this function is executed mechanically 
and not subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. This finding ties in with the finding of an earlier study which then 
established that the same scrutiny was “yet to be fully realized” (Agyeman-Duah, 2002: 20), due largely to a 
paucity of capacity, including a lack of material and human resources.   
The broader watchdog role of civil society is also important. Just as the long period of military rule 
stunted the growth in civil society in Ghana, equally, the opening up of democratic space in the past decade has 
enabled civil society organisations to flourish, including a sub-section that has taken a special interest in civil-
military matters (Agyeman Duah, 2002), with the media particularly important as a watchdog on military affairs.  
 The Military’s own Institutional Learning  
The members of the military interviewed have experienced life under both military and civilian leadership and 
are in a position to compare which of them attended to their needs. Under Jerry John Rawlings’ rule, the military 
has the experience of life under both military and civilian leadership. Their conclusion is that, in the fourth 
republic, their needs are better taken care of by the civilian leadership.  
Some of the members of the military interviewed believe that the Armed Forces generally receive a 
better deal at the hands of civilian governments. The irony in the role played by President Rawlings in stabilizing 
is that the military resent the instruments used. Some of the members of the military interviewed accuse 
Rawlings of employing undemocratic approaches in his control of the military during his tenure.  
The officers interviewed resent the persistence use of subjective controls by the Rawlings government, 
especially the maintenance of special security units, the suppression of public debate and lack of dialogue. The 
focus group discussants were not necessarily resentful of the practices but viewed them as unnecessary. The 
civilian members among the respondents also complained of executive dominance and relative marginalization 
of Parliament, and attempts to militarize what have traditionally been civilian institutions of law and order by the 
Rawlings government (Fieldwork, 2018). This confirms the findings by Hutchful (1997a: 266) who argues that 
“in reality the Ministry of Defence has essentially been the Ghana Armed Forces, and traditionally ministerial 
control has been weak or non-existent.”  
The Military and Democratic Deepening in Ghana  
Diamond (2005) discusses democratic consolidation as a state in a democracy when the elites in society and the 
mass public generally accepts democratic system of government as the only game in town. He adds that one of 
the three generic tasks that all democracies must perform if they are to consolidate is democratic deepening. He 
argues that democratic deepening makes the institutions of state “more liberal, accountable, responsible and 
representative” (p. 112). A major challenge which comes out of this in relation to nascent democracies is “to 
reduce the autonomous and democratically unaccountable power of the military” (Diamond, 2005: 113). 
However, as discussed above, democratic control of the military is a normative issue which rests on a set of 
ideas, institutions, and behaviors that has developed over time in democratic societies (Hutchful, 1997a, 1997b; 
Kohn, 1997).  
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Following Leftwich (2008), it is argued here that the politics of states are responsible for the translation 
of the ideas and institutions into normative forms for both the military and the democratic political leadership. 
The actions of the military which serve to deepen democracy include their acknowledgement of the democratic 
regime as the only game in town. The study, therefore, tested the Ghanaian military’s acknowledgement and 
acceptance of democracy as the preferred system of government.   
The members of the military who participated in the focus group discussions converged on democracy 
as the preferred system of government. They came to this conclusion after reviewing Ghana’s political history 
and analyzing the current social, economic and political environment. They juxtaposed current conditions against 
their knowledge of pre-fourth republic conditions and came to the conclusion that they prefer the current 
democratic dispensation.  This understanding was re-echoed by the officers interviewed. They believe that 
Ghanaian politics has “calmed down” in the fourth republic and this achievement is not to be taken for granted 
(Fieldwork, 2018). They, however, acknowledged that democracy “is a good system” and must be made to work. 
By this, they further explained that there are challenges in the way Ghana’s democratic politics is functioning. 
They cited accountability as the main challenge encountered by the current democratic dispensation.   
When asked to talk about the institution of state better placed to lead the management of the affairs 
(governance) of the Ghanaian state, both the focus group and the officers interviewed did not include the military 
as an institution. The officers, however, added individual military officers as also having the capacity to 
contribute significantly to the governance of the state. The focus group discussants and the interviewees cited 
political parties as better placed to lead the governance of the country, although they quickly added corruption in 
political parties.   
Questions were further asked about the involvement of the military in politics. The ensuing discussions 
focused on the performance of past military governments and the fortunes of the individual officers and men 
who were active participants in those governments. The discussants frankly acknowledged that, like the civilian 
governments the military overthrew, the military governments formed afterwards ended up to amass wealth. 
They could not agree as to the nature of the PNDC, as being a military regime or a civilian one. Some added it to 
the military regimes of the past; others called it civilian regime with massive military support. The discussants 
were not particularly proud of the fortunes of the officers and men who were part of former military regimes.   
The officers interviewed were very critical of past civilian regimes and defended the involvement of the 
military in politics. They were of the view that the military was “drawn into Ghanaian politics for the first time” 
in the coup that ousted the first republic (Fieldwork, 2018). They added that they did the honorable thing by not 
deciding to stay. They, at the same time, were categorical that the military as an institution should not take over 
the management of the state. They added that they feel proud much more with their retired colleagues who 
manage the resources they acquire through peace-keeping than those who participated in politics. They added 
that, while they see honour in the lives of the first group who did not participate in politics, they see retired 
members of the military who were in government as being in some sort of continuous conflict with society.         
The discussion above indicates that the constitutions of democratic polities structure the political 
institutions such that the military is subordinated to the civilian authorities (Huntington, 1957; Hutchful, 1997a; 
Kohn, 1997). However, there is no in-built mechanism in constitutional arrangements that works to ensure 
compliance of the constitutional provisions of democratic control of the military. The political leadership of the 
relevant state has to generate such mechanisms.   
Asked to talk about what would keep the military out of politics, the response was a call for the “system 
to work” for the democratic politics to boost the image of the military in society. The discussants in the focus 
group discussion were mainly concerned about their economic security. “You see all the brouhaha in the past 
about coups were about money matters; everybody is concerned about how they can cater for their families”, a 
discussant expressed to which the others agreed.  
The officers examined this issue from a different angle. They argued that the experience they have from 
peacekeeping indicates to them that economic issues are at the heart of many conflicts in Africa. “The life of an 
army officer is such that when the economy is bad he faces challenges beyond economic matters. It brings in 
issues of status and pride”, an officer concurred. This position of the officers reflects Diamond’s (2005) 
argument about the need to enhance the socio-economic security, honour and status of the military in (the 
Ghanaian) society.  
Article 210/3 establishes the functions of the Ghana Armed Forces as follows: “The Armed Forces shall 
be equipped and maintained to perform their role of defence of Ghana as well as such other functions for the 
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development of Ghana as the President may determine.”  This is further interpreted to be the maintenance of 
Ghana’s internal security, defense of the sovereign and territorial duty of Ghana, and to be prepared to take part 
in regional and international operations subject to national objectives.   
As stated earlier, the defence duty of the Ghana Armed Forces is operationalized in this study to include 
not only defence against external aggression but to uphold the democratic regime as established in the 
constitution of the fourth republic of Ghana. Has the military voluntarily accepted these roles of theirs as 
established in the constitution of the fourth republic of Ghana? What evidence is there to confirm this beyond 
their de facto withdrawal from political activities in the fourth republic of Ghana?   
Members of the military interviewed and those that participated in the focus group discussion are very 
clear in their minds what their core functions are. They readily mentioned defence of the Ghanaian state as their 
core function, and this has traditionally been interpreted to refer to defence against external treats. They, 
however, added that they are also to defend the state against internal threats. The officers interviewed argued 
further that there used to be some confusion with the interpretation of the nature of the internal defence. One 
officer indicated that: “The military always feels challenged as to what to do when politicians begin to impose 
themselves on the state. You wonder whether you shouldn’t intervene to restore the established political order, I 
mean constitutional rule” (Fieldwork, 2018).     
The analysis above confirms earlier studies about the civil-military in Africa and elsewhere. They lend 
support to the state and, for that matter, the regime to the extent that the regime functions to provide protection 
for their status and security. General Ocran’s candid acknowledgement of this understanding stated above should 
be reproduced here since it clarifies the issue. He famously stated that “in Africa, a contented army, however 
small, is a pillar of security and economic growth”.  
Huntington’s (1957) theory of “objective civilian control” of the military is most profound. He asserted 
that the state should encourage "an independent military sphere" so that "multifarious civilian groups" would not 
"maximize their power in military affairs" by involving the military in political activity. Such interference, he 
believed, not only diminished the effectiveness of military forces and thus a nation's security, but actually invited 
the military to involve itself in governance beyond national security affairs. An officer corps focused on its own 
profession (and granted sufficient independence to organize itself and practice the art of war without interference 
in those areas requiring technical expertise) would be politically neutral and less likely to intervene in politics.  
The paradox of Huntington's formulation is that while "objective" civilian control might minimize military 
involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian control over military affairs. This establishes a situation where 
politics is separated from administration and authority is separated from responsibility.   
The Ghanaian military, like their counterparts in both mature and nascent democracies, seem not to 
have issues with the concept and practice of civilian control of the military. However, as Bahadur (2016: 1) has 
indicated “in a democracy the military should be under political control, but doesn’t have to be under 
bureaucracy’s thumb”. Democratic control of the military implies the paradox of Huntington's formulation that 
while "objective" civilian control might minimize military involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian 
control over military affairs (Kohn, 1997).  
When the army officers interviewed as part of this study talk about the need for them to be able to keep 
a modicum of dignity in their social life, the implication is essentially that the democratic system must work 
effectively. This does not mean that new democracies should transform the challenging political and economic 
situations of the systems they inherited overnight. At the minimum, they should demonstrate that they are fixing 
the system. As argued by Kohn (1997), civilian control can reinforce democracy, but civilian control is only one 
aspect—necessary but not sufficient—of democratic rule. The democratic leadership must commit themselves to 
the rules of the game normatively and behaviorally. There is no time dimension to manifest demonstration that 
one means business.  
Regime legitimacy also implies that the government and the processes of governance are in conformity 
with the rules of the political and economic game (Kohn, 1997; Leftwich, 2008). This renders the system 
legitimate in the eyes of doth the elites and the mass public.  Without a stable and legitimate governmental 
system and process, the military may interfere in order to protect society from chaos, internal challenge, or 
external attack, even when intervention may itself perpetuate instability and destroy legitimacy in government. 
To the extent that soldiers accept the principle of civilian control in the aftermath of military government, they 
do so in a diluted, conditional manner. Future takeovers are a 'thinkable' possibility, depending upon the actions 
of the civilian governors” (Hutchful, 1997a; Kohn, 1997). 
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What are the Causal Elements Responsible for the Current State of Civil-Military Relations in Ghana and 
Their Potential to Make the Military Submit to Civilian Authority? 
Democracy cannot be wished into place, and neither can good governance (Leftwich, 2008). Leftwich continues 
that it is rather the politics of states which establishes and institutionalizes such procedures. Rustow (1970: 28-
29) adds that:   
a country is likely to attain democracy not by coping the constitutional laws or parliamentary 
practices of some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing up to its particular conflicts 
and by devising or adapting effective procedures for their accommodation.   
The arguments above emphasize the interplay between politics and institutions. Certain elements are, therefore, 
responsible for the relative stable nature of civil-military relations in Ghana’s fourth republic and their potential 
to institutionalize the constitutional arrangement which renders the military subservient to civilian authority. The 
elements identified in the current study are discussed below.  
A Functioning Democracy Which Better Addresses the Needs of the Military Than Before  
Democratization in the fourth republic of Ghana means the return of the military to the barracks. This did not, 
however, result from a violent rejection of the military; rather, it came about through reforms of the political 
system of Ghana and the institutions of state. Reform measures introduced since the onset of the fourth republic 
of Ghana seek to professionalize the military.  
To start with, the military has had to accept that the principle that subordinates them to the elected 
political leaders applies. The military hierarchy acknowledges this fact and the officers interviewed confirmed 
this as “something they now take for granted” (Fieldwork, 2018). Closely related to this normative development 
is the relocation of the Ministry of Defence from the Burma Camp to the place popularly known among the 
military as “Square”. The relocation was part of the reform measures outlined by the Limann administration but 
could not be implemented (Hutchful, 1997a, 1997b). The relocation is viewed as symbolically significant as it 
was and is still seen as representing the break in the domination of the military over the ministry (Hutchful, 
1997a; Fieldwork, 2018).       
Elections as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism in the Ghanaian Society 
One major conflict in African states which has worked to bring the military into politics is the political conflict 
as characterized by Boafo-Arthur, (2008), the conflict about a mechanism to share political power which is 
acceptable to the elites in these states. Democratic elections have been described as constituting such mechanism 
when the democratic system receives the voluntary support of the elites and mass public (Diamond, 2005; 
Rustow, 1970). Article 66 clauses 1 and 2 of the fourth republican constitution of Ghana establishes a-two-four-
year term of office for the president, and this has been respected by the political parties and the citizens of Ghana 
since 1992 when the first presidential and parliamentary elections were first conducted. The electoral process has 
since gone through three political turnovers in the years 2000, 2008, and 2016.  
These developments provide answers to the political conflict which bedeviled African states for the 
decades after independence. An implication of this development which relates to the current study is the 
commitment to the democratic system by Ghanaian elites and the mass public which includes the military. 
Ghanaians have demonstrated that they are strongly committed to democracy as a system of government in spite 
of the economic challenges which persist in the country (CDD-Ghana, 2005). The over five rounds of surveys 
conducted by Afro Barometer consistently indicate that almost 80% of Ghanaians prefer democratic governance 
to any other system of government they could think of. Although this study did not conduct a survey to gauge the 
commitment of the military to democracy, the interviews and the focus group discussions conducted lend 
support to the findings by Afro Barometer referred to above. As discussed above, the discussants in the focus 
group discussion unanimously expressed a preference for democracy as a system of government. The army 
officers interviewed also support democracy, although they expect the democratic system to deliver political and 
economic goods.  
The Rawlings Factor  
Former president Jerry John Rawlings has played roles of destabilizing the political process of Ghana and then 
stabilizing it. Rawlings’ role in the political stability of the fourth republic of Ghana is explained by among other 
factors his ability to reform the military to re-instill orderliness based on the traditional command structure 
notably its familiarity with, and experience as regards, issues that affect the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police. 
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Unlike previous Presidents, Rawlings is a retired military officer with a record of having advocated military 
reforms.   
The involvement of the military in politics in Ghana led by the junior officers and some non-
commissioned officers disrupted command and control functions and further affected discipline (Handley & 
Mills, 2001). The third republic of Ghana especially suffered from this challenge and many officers vacated their 
post in fear for their lives (Hutchful, 1997a). It, therefore, came as little surprise when the government of 
President Limann was overthrown, and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was formed in its 
place. The character of the new regime as to being a military or not is disputed. It has been variously described 
as military regime (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), a civilian-cum-regime (Gyimah‐Boadi, 1994) and non-military 
regime because it did not represent the corporate interest of the military (Handley & Mills, 2001). The difficulty 
in establishing the real character of the PNDC might come from the fact that the entire membership of the 
cabinet and majority of the PNDC members were civilians. However, the main constituency of the regime was 
the military. In fact, military officers and members of the other ranks were appointed to be second-in-command 
in all ministries, and as heads of state organisations and agencies, regional and district administrations 
(Agyeman-Duah, 1987).  
The PNDC, thus, successfully warded off several coup attempts, and between 1982 and 1985 purged 
the military and established the 64th Battalion. This eventually served to establish control over the military 
(Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Handley & Mills, 2001; Hutchful, 1997a). Hutchful notes that Jerry John Rawlings 
transferred this model of control from the PNDC era to the civilian NDC period.   
The Minister of Defence in the first government of the fourth republic, Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama, had 
enjoyed a lengthy tenure in the post, and had been in the Armed Forces Council prior to his appointment by the 
PNDC. The Deputy Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-Colonel K. T. Donkor, a former Chief of Staff, was also a 
retired military officer and regards himself as bridging the (civilian) Minister and the Generals (Agyeman-Duah, 
1987).  One cannot, therefore, doubt the success of President Rawlings in stabilizing the Armed Forces and 
getting them to accept the implications and advantages of constitutional rule. This development explains political 
stability in the Fourth Republic of Ghana. 
However, this has to be set against Rawlings government’s undemocratic approaches in achieving this 
feat. His approaches include the persistence of subjective controls, the maintenance of special security units, the 
suppression of public debate and lack of dialogue, the executive dominance and relative marginalization of 
Parliament, and attempts to militarism what have traditionally been civilian institutions of law and order 
(Hutchful, 1997a). Jerry John Rawlings, nevertheless, laid a foundation for democratic control of the military in 
the fourth republic of Ghana. It is to his credit for the restoration of the functions of command and control and 
discipline into the military.  
 Institutional Learning by the Military   
A second positive factor is the acceptance within the military hierarchy of the principle of civil supremacy.  
Apart from the success of Rawlings in subordinating the Armed Forces to political authority, most officers have 
undoubtedly realised that the traumatic events of I979 and 1981 subverted their legitimacy. “It was dangerous to 
be an officer in those days”, an officer declared in respect of events of those periods (Fieldwork, 2018). 
Commanders and the elected government agree that they have a common interest in stabilizing their authority. 
While virtually all Commanders have expressed strong support for professionalization (Hutchful, 1997a), it is 
doubtful if there could be any possess of sufficient stature and confidence to resist, perhaps, the wishes of the 
President and to claim the unambiguous loyalty of their subordinates, the minimum requirements for them to 
play an effective role in defining the future of the military.  
Conclusion  
This study sought to provide some explanations to civil-military relations in the fourth republic of Ghana, which 
is going through democratic process.  
The study initially sought to explain the nature of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic of 
Ghana in the context of a stabilizing democratic polity. It did so by examining whether the politics of the period 
has successfully established norms of democratic control over the Ghanaian military given that the constitution 
of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, de jure, politicizes the military institution.  The data from both primary and 
secondary sources examined indicate that the military is going through the process of norm formation. They 
crucially support the current democratic process and wished that they also could be allowed to elect their own 
leaders the way the Ghanaian society does. Crucially, the military acknowledge the constitution of the fourth 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RHSS 
Vol.9, No.14, 2019 
 
115 
republic of Ghana as the supreme document in Ghana which guides political, social and economic life. It is, in 
fact, a normative reference point for members of the military with regard to political change. They, furthermore, 
acknowledge the subservience of the military to the democratically elected leaders of the Ghanaian state. 
However, they expect the democratic system to deliver political, social and economic goods. 
The study further sought to explain the causal elements responsible for the current state of civil-military 
relations in Ghana and its potential to become consolidated.  One of the causal elements is a functioning 
democracy which better addresses the needs of the military than before.  Democratization in the Fourth Republic 
of Ghana has introduced reform measures which seek to professionalize the military.  The officers and men 
interviewed concede that they enjoy improved conditions of service under democratic leadership than under 
military authorities. The literature further point to the benefits which accrue to the military from their 
involvement in United Nation supervised peace keeping activities. They also receive additional training and 
equipment as democratic dividends (Handley & Mills, 2001). 
 Closely related to this element is the successful mediation of the electoral process in the major political 
conflict in a democracy, political competition for political power. The Fourth Republic has gone through three 
political turnovers, which indicates an increasingly consolidating democracy. Other causal elements include the 
Rawlings factor in the Ghanaian political system which essentially points to having played the role of returning 
the limitary to the barracks. The leadership of President Rawlings started the reform measures which have been 
continued by his successors. Moreover, there is the effect of historical antecedents of the military’s involvements 
in Ghanaian politics and the fate of the protagonists. The case of the execution of the General following the June 
Fourth Uprising and the purge is a typical example. 
Based on the findings, the study recommends that the concern expressed by the military about their 
status, and economic security reinforces the need for the democratic process in the fourth republic of Ghana to 
improve in democratic good governance. There is the need for the democratic regime to secure political and civil 
liberties and the generation of economic goods. These function to provide institutional guarantees for individual 
security, status and wealth. It, further, renders the democratic regime more legitimate (Diamond, 2005; Kohn, 
1997). As argued above, “the tradition of legitimacy in government acts on the one hand to deter military 
interference in politics, and on the other to counteract intervention should it threaten or occur” (Kohn, 1997: 5). 
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